Fishery Co-Management in Japanese Coastal Fisheries by Uchida, Hirotsugu
Fishery co-management in Japanese coastal ﬁsheries
Hirotsugu Uchida∗
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Davis
One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616
May 16, 2005
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics
Association Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, July 24-27, 2005
Copyright 2005 by Hirotsugu Uchida. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears
on all such copies.
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: uchida@primal.ucdavis.edu. The author thanks Osamu Baba of Tokyo
University of Marine Science and Technology for his help with the data. Helpful comments and support from
Jim Wilen throughout the development of this paper is also appreciated.Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the Japanese coastal ﬁshery co-management
system. In particular, the paper focuses on the eﬀectiveness of Fishery Management
Organizations (FMOs), which are established by groups of ﬁshermen and set rules
and regulations that they self-enforce. The paper ﬁnds that FMOs engaged actively
in marketing practices in their output markets signiﬁcantly increased their member
ﬁshermen’s revenue. Proceeds sharing rules, where individual proceeds are pooled and
shared among the members, appeared to have marginal eﬀects despite of several anec-
dotal evidence that suggests otherwise. Findings suggest that beneﬁt gains from the
output markets is substantial in successful ﬁshery co-management.
Keywords: ﬁshery co-management, marketing, sharing rules, Japan
1 Introduction
The concept of ﬁshery co-management has been discussed for some time as an alternative
to top-down centralized ﬁshery management. The idea is based on the notion that local
resource users have better knowledge of the resource they exploit, and thus decentralization
of managerial authority to local user groups can improve the performance of resource man-
agement. In practice, however, co-management is implemented in many ﬁsheries around the
world, and in some cases for very long time (Wilson et al., 2003). The literature has yet to
reach a consensus on the deﬁnition of co-management, but the key feature is that it requires
individual ﬁshermen to cooperate and act collectively for mutual beneﬁts.
While the idea is gaining much attention and the regimes being implemented in various
places, ﬁshery co-management is yet to be well understood. Economists have been skeptical
about the eﬀectiveness and sustainability of such resource management regimes, primarily
because they involve collective action of individual resource users. They argue, for example,
even if the incumbents cooperate and manage to enhance the economic rents from the ﬁshery,
success attracts new entrants to the industry only to dissipate that rent. In fact, if the
incumbents anticipate this happening, then cooperation might not take place at all. Co-
management might also be vulnerable to cheating. Despite these theoretical objections,
however, there are many successful cases of co-management, including those in ﬁsheries.
Other discipline such as sociology and anthropology have conducted case studies of co-
1management, and some derived conditions that need to be met for successful co-management,
such as those regarding the resource system characteristics and institutional arrangements
(e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996).1 But the question still remains: empirically,
does ﬁshery co-management positively impact the resource stocks and economic returns to
ﬁshermen? Do results diﬀer depending on the self-management practices adopted by the
ﬁshery co-management regime?
The importance of better understanding of ﬁshery co-management is that not only is it
widely implemented, but it could be the only solution for many developing countries, where
the government is incapable of centralized regulation and where market infrastructures are
too underdeveloped to adopt market-based solutions such as tradable quotas. Perhaps for
this reason, many studies on ﬁshery co-management are those in developing countries (Wilson
et al., 2003). Fishery co-management in Japan, on the other hand, is not much analyzed
despite the fact that Japan has more than 1,700 ﬁshery co-management regimes managing
its coastal ﬁsheries.2 In addition, not only the statistical data on ﬁshery co-management are
more readily available than many developing countries, but the fact that these regimes are
all under the same national laws and policies and share much of the social characteristics –
which sometimes becomes a trouble in cross-country analysis – are great advantages from
the empirical study’s point of view.
This paper conducts empirical analysis of the Japanese coastal ﬁsheries, many of which
are managed by ﬁshery co-management regimes. Unlike in most Western countries, coastal
water in Japan were historically demarcated into parcels known as “ﬁshing rights” areas
where exclusive rights of access to these areas were granted to local Fishery Cooperative
Associations (henceforth FCAs). As expected, within each area, member-ﬁshermen of FCAs
competed in open-access fashion, resulting in depletion of ﬁsh stocks and low proﬁtability
from ﬁsheries. In response, subgroup of local ﬁshermen formed what are now called Fishery
1For a review of the literature and research on common-pool resource co-management, see Agrawal (2001).
2Exceptions include Asada et al. (1983), Ruddle (1987), Yamamoto (1995) and Makino and Matsuda
(2005), but none have empirical analysis that quantitatively evaluate the eﬀect of collective ﬁshery manage-
ment in Japan.
2Management Organizations (henceforth FMOs), often under their parent-FCAs, to collec-
tively manage the ﬁsheries they had exclusive rights to. The rules and activities which FMOs
implement and practice vary. Of particular interest in this paper are the proceeds sharing
rules adopted and marketing practices. Proceeds sharing rules are agreements that harvests,
revenues or proﬁts are pooled and then redistributed back to the members; several theoret-
ical and empirical case studies suggest that such sharing rules could enhance the economic
performance of ﬁsheries (e.g., Schott, 2003; Platteau and Seki, 2001; Gaspart and Seki, 2003;
Uchida, 2004, 2005). Marketing practices adopted by FMOs include landing the catch alive,
quality control (e.g., proper icing), processing (adding value), expanding market channels
and measures taken in ground transportation.
The paper focuses on the impact of FMOs and their practices on the ﬁshery revenues
of ﬁshermen by investigating whether ﬁshermen participating in FMOs have higher revenue
than those who do not participate.3 We ﬁnd that ﬁshermen participating in FMOs with
marketing practices had signiﬁcantly higher revenues. This supports the argument that the
beneﬁts of rationalizing ﬁsheries arising from the output markets are substantial (Homans
and Wilen, 2005). On the other hand, the proceeds sharing rules appear to be insigniﬁcant
in this analysis. The need for further investigation is thus called for, in light of case studies
that suggest otherwise, for the economic roles of sharing rules and conditions for them to
succeed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief background on Japanese coastal
ﬁsheries and the deﬁnition of the terminologies used throughout this paper. Section 3 de-
scribes the data used and reports the main empirical analysis results. Conclusions are given
in section 4.
3Ideally we would want to have data on proﬁts rather than revenues, but the data set used, namely 10th
Fishery Census, only had revenues data. Also, the state of resource stock levels was not included in the
analysis because such data were not available in the census and no other comparable data set was found.
32 Background
The deﬁnition of the terminologies used throughout this paper describing the Japanese
coastal ﬁsheries and management are as follows:
• Fishing rights area: a parcel of coastal water demarcated for exclusive commercial
use. It is analogous to the territorial use rights in ﬁsheries (TURFs). Fishing rights
are granted to FCAs and not to the individual member-ﬁshermen. Thus, only the
members of FCAs are allowed to commercially ﬁsh in these areas. The boundaries
of each area roughly correspond to that of local municipality and extend outwards to
the sea, but how far they extend out varies. Some have only 1km or less while others
extend more than 5km out into the sea coast, depending on the ocean topography, such
as the existence and the size of continental shelf, and the types of ﬁsheries operated
within the coastal water. Figure 1 shows an example of how ﬁshing rights areas are
deﬁned.
• Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA): a collective body of individual ﬁshing
units (individuals and small-scale companies). Its functions are similar to that of any
other industrial cooperative, plus the distinctive function of administering the ﬁshing
rights granted to the Association. There are approximately 1,600 FCAs nationwide
(Zengyoren, 2005).
• Fishery Management Organization (FMO): a group of ﬁshermen, usually within
an FCA who share the same ﬁshing grounds or operate the same ﬁshery, collectively
performing the tasks of resource and/or harvest management. Some FMOs are formed
across neighboring FCAs and span across multiple ﬁshing rights areas, but mostly
they operate within their own ﬁshing rights area. There are often multiple FMOs in
a ﬁshing district, usually corresponding to multiple ﬁsheries operated in that district.
There were 1,734 FMOs nationwide in 1998 (MAFF, 2001).4
4For historical background of ﬁshing rights, FCAs and FMOs, see Yamamoto (1995) and Makino and
Matsuda (2005).
4• Fishing districts: deﬁned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
of Japan (MAFF), it is a community, within the boundaries of a local municipality,
operating ﬁsheries under a common environment, such as sharing the same ﬁshing
rights area and commonalities in other ﬁshery-related activities. Generally speaking
there is one ﬁshing rights area, and an FCA that administers it, per ﬁshing district
(see Figure 2). Due to recent trends of merges of FCAs, however, this is changing
rapidly. After mergers, former FCAs often remain as branch oﬃces and retain much
of their independence in ﬁshery operations. Fishing district is also a geographical unit
for which the data in the Fishery Census, a nationwide survey conducted every ﬁve
years by MAFF, are reported.
• Proceeds sharing rule: mutually agreed conventions whereby proceeds, such as
harvests, revenues or proﬁts, are pooled and redistributed back to the members in a
certain way. Proceeds may be shared uniformly or weighted by some index such as the
vessel size or the level of individual catch.
• Fishing units: economic entities engaged in ﬁsheries for commercial purpose. There
are six categories of ﬁshing units deﬁned in the Fishery Census: individuals (house-
holds), corporations, FCAs, Production Cooperative Associations (PCAs), Joint oper-
ations (two or more individuals jointly operating, JO) and others (government agencies
and research institutions). Individual ﬁshing units include only those who own and
operate the business; hired ﬁshermen are excluded.
The Japanese government has implemented FMO-based co-management of its coastal
ﬁsheries as national policy since the early 1980s, but many FMOs have much longer history.
Therefore, it was not the case that the government imposed the co-management regimes on
its ﬁsheries, but rather it codiﬁed the de facto regimes that were already in place. The census
began recording data on FMOs in 1988 (8th Fishery Census). At that time there were 1,339
FMOs and the number has been increasing steadily; in 1993 there were 1,524 FMOs and in
the latest census (1998) there were 1,734 FMOs.
5FCAs and FMOs are not necessarily the same entity, but are closely related. Among
1,734 FMOs in 1998, nearly 95% of them were operated by an FCA or its subdivisions.5
Clearly, FMOs utilize the functions of FCAs such as the administration of ﬁshing rights and
controlled membership (Uchida and Wilen, 2004).
The nature of self-regulation varies among the FMOs. Some FMOs simply self-impose a
ﬁshing season to avoid ﬁshing during the spawning period. At the other extreme, some FMOs
utilize sophisticated ﬁshing eﬀort coordination schemes where representatives of member
ﬁshermen meet every day during the ﬁshing season to decide the details of that day’s ﬁshing
operations. The primary objectives diﬀer as well; some focus on cost savings through eﬀort
reduction while others focus on harvest control to avoid market glut.
Another feature which some FMOs have implemented is a system which we refer to as
“proceeds sharing rule.” According to MAFF (2001), 294 or roughly 17% of FMOs have
some kind of sharing rules implemented. Among these, 144 (49%) FMOs have uniform
distribution of proceeds and 129 (44%) FMOs have weighted distributions. The share of
FMOs with sharing rules is also increasing over time, rising from 11% in 1988 to 15.6% in
1993, and to 17% in 1998.
The traditional view of sharing rules is that they could encourage ﬁshermen to shirk
and result in too little collective ﬁshing eﬀort since each ﬁsherman no longer individually
gains by out competing the others. Schott (2003) argues that such shirking is beneﬁcial
since it curtails excessive ﬁshing eﬀort that leads to overexploitation. Uchida (2005) claimed
that sharing rules could induce collusive behavior among the ﬁshermen noncooperatively
and generate beneﬁts by exploiting market power they have in local markets.6 However,
an empirical question still remains of whether FMOs with sharing rules could endure and
5It is not surprising, therefore, that many researchers have concluded that successful ﬁshery co-
management in Japan rests on the strength of its tradition of FCAs (e.g., Hanna (2003)). We believe
this is somewhat misleading, as it conveys an impression that such management schemes cannot be imple-
mented in other places. Uchida and Wilen (2004) argue the importance of FCAs and ﬁshing rights using the
conceptual framework of the theory of clubs, focusing on the functions of these institutions that are more
generally applicable.
6Many ﬁsheries potentially have certain degree of local market power since the product is very perishable
and often costly to transport. Raw product markets are thus likely to be local or regional in scope.
6succeed, and overcome shirking or other non-productive behavior. The increasing number
of FMOs implementing sharing rules seems to suggest that at least many ﬁshermen have
perception that they are beneﬁcial.
Anecdotal evidence shows there are FMOs with sharing rules that are working reasonably
well. Platteau and Seki (2001) surveyed ﬁshermen in Toyama Bay where there were two
FMOs with sharing rules under diﬀerent FCAs but targeting the same species.7 Uchida
(2004) studied another FMO with a sharing rule in Suruga Bay; in this case ﬁshermen from
two FCAs targeting the same species formed one uniﬁed FMO. This FMO has adopted a
very sophisticated ﬁshing eﬀort coordination scheme, including the harvest control to avoid
market glut. In both cases the sharing rules are functioning as a supporting – perhaps




The data are from the 10th Fishery Census conducted in 1998 by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The survey was conducted with ﬁshing units as the basic
unit of observation. However, the published census data are aggregated to the ﬁshing district
level, reporting only either the sum or the average values. The ﬁshing unit-level data are
not available from MAFF due to the duty of conﬁdentiality on their part. Thus, our unit of
observation is at the ﬁshing district level.
The ﬁrst problem faced with the census data is that not all data are available by each
unit-category, but rather summed up in a district. This raises a concern if one is to compare
the average revenues of FMO-participating and non-participating units (henceforth referred
as “FMO units” and “non-FMO units”, respectively). If the characteristics, such as average
revenues, of each category diﬀer signiﬁcantly from each other then such diﬀerence will cause
7Platteau and Seki (2001) refers the sharing rules as the“pooling system.”
7a bias in our estimation since we cannot control for it. For example, the average revenue for
FMO units, inclusive of all six unit-categories, was $95.7K and that of non-FMO units was
$143.9K. Does this imply that FMO units are earning less revenue than non-FMO units?
If corporations tend to earn far more revenue than individual ﬁshing units and there are
more corporations as non-FMO units than as FMO units, then such comparison of average
revenues is biased and misleading. Indeed, Table 1 clearly shows that this is the case. The
diﬀerence is most vivid between the individual units and the rest.
To bypass this problem, the analysis will focus only on the individual ﬁshing units. The
justiﬁcation for this is that the individual ﬁshing units are overwhelmingly dominant in both
FMO and non-FMO units. In practice, we took the ﬁshing districts that have FMO units
and/or non-FMO units consisting only of individual ﬁshing units. Note that, because the
observations are at a ﬁshing district level, some ﬁshing districts might have only either FMO
units or non-FMO units data while other ﬁshing districts might have both.
The second issue is the treatment of inﬂuential observations, particularly if they are due
to the measurement errors. The major concern is that whether a ﬁshing unit is individual
or corporation (or any other) depends on how the units are registered, not on how they are
actually operating. If a unit is substantially a corporation but registered as an individual,
then the sample would be contaminated.
While it was not possible to check each observation (i.e., ﬁshing districts) one by one,
such mismatches are likely to reveal themselves as outliers, or inﬂuential observation. To
identify inﬂuential observations, the regression diagnostic described in Belsley et al. (1980)
was conducted. Two ﬁshing districts were suspected of containing units that are substantially
corporations but registered as individuals. These two districts were thus deleted from the
sample.
83.2 Estimation
The primary interest is whether FMO units have higher revenues than non-FMO units after
controlling for other factors that aﬀect the revenue level. One set of covariates are those
which are indicative of capital levels. Intuitively, the higher the level of capital the higher
the revenues, ceteris paribus. This set includes the number of non-powered boats, powered
boats and vessels owned by a unit, vessel tonnage and vessel engine horsepower. Non-
powered boats are those with no engines attached; they constitute about 2% of all boats
and vessels owned and operated by the ﬁshing units. They are used mainly in small-scale
near-shore ﬁshery collecting shellﬁsh and seaweed.8 Powered boats are deﬁned as those
with external engines attached to otherwise non-powered boats, and vessels are those with
integrated engines. Tonnage and engine horsepower are those of vessels only.9 The averages
for the tonnage and horsepower are deﬁned as per vessel per unit, to incorporate the fact
that one unit might own two or more vessels and one vessel might be jointly-owned by two
or more units (Table 2, second row).
Another set of covariates are those of ﬁsheries that units are operating. It is reasonable to
assume that diﬀerent ﬁsheries yield, on average, diﬀerent levels of revenue and thus require
control. The census records the number of units participating in each ﬁshery categorized by
the gear-type, such as bottom trawl, gill net, etc. One could also control by the targeted
species, but the census does not provide such data. Furthermore, quite a few species are
caught by diﬀerent gear across the regions; for example, clams are caught by diving and
bottom trawl. For the same targeted species, namely the clams in this case, revenues may
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two methods of harvesting. Therefore, controlling by the
gear-type would be appropriate.
Additional explanation on the ﬁshery gear-type dummy variables is necessary, for they
are not necessarily dichotomous dummy variables due to the way Fishery Census data are
made available. There are two issues. The ﬁrst issue is that most ﬁshing districts have two or
8Personal communication with Dr. Baba.
9The correlation between the vessel tonnage and engine horsepower in the sample was 0.58, and thus
both variables were included in subsequent regressions.
9more gear-types operated within their boundaries. However, there is only single observation
for average revenue in a ﬁshing district, i.e., ideal data of average revenue for each gear-type
per ﬁshing district are not available. Thus, gear-type dummy variables are calculated as
shares based on the number of operating units in each gear-type, which serves as weights.
The second issue is that a single unit often operates two or more gear-types in a district.
To accommodate this fact in calculating the shares, such units were counted twice or more
according to the total number of ﬁsheries they contained. The denominator is the grand
total of units, that is, including double or more counting of a unit. In doing so, we are acting
as if each unit is operating only one gear-type in calculating the shares. Shares add up to
one by this method, so one ﬁshery variable was dropped from the regressions (Table 2, third
row).
Two additional sets of covariates were included regarding the FMO units, namely the
sharing rules and marketing practices. The census provides the number of FMOs within
a ﬁshing district that implemented proceeds sharing rules with uniform, weighted or other
forms of distributional rules. The variables were constructed such that each is a share of
total number of FMOs in that ﬁshing district. Note that one unit can at most implement
one type of sharing rule but not all FMOs have it, thus the shares do not necessarily sum
up to one (Table 2, fourth row).
Marketing practices, as deﬁned in the census, include (a) keeping the catch live, (b)
quality control, (c) processing (dressing, etc.), (d) expanding sales channel and (e) trans-
portation improvement. Due to high consumption of raw ﬁsh (sashimi) in Japan, keeping
the catch alive and well in a ﬁsh tank on a vessel is an important value-added.10 Quality
control includes carefully releasing the catch from a net or a hook, and proper icing while
in transport. Processing is another form of adding value to their catch, such as dressing the
ﬁsh. Fishery Census reports the number of FMOs engaged in any of the above marketing
10Simply keeping the catch alive is not good enough. If the ﬁsh become weak during the time kept in a
tank then, in terms of the quality of ﬂesh, they might be worse than those being immediately frozen or killed
and iced. It takes a great deal of care, such as maintaining the water temperature at optimum, to keep the
catch alive and well until the vessel reaches the landing port.
10practices. If an FMO is engaged in two or more marketing practices, that FMO is recorded
in all of them. To incorporate such facts, marketing variables are calculated as the share
of FMOs engaged in a certain marketing practice over the total number of FMOs in that
ﬁshing district. Note that, with this calculation method, the shares could sum up to more
than one (Table 2, last row).
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in the
sample. The average revenue for FMO units was higher than that of non-FMO units but the
unconditional diﬀerence was statistically insigniﬁcant. While the average number of vessels
owned was similar, the tonnage and engine horsepower were larger for FMO units. This
could be an indication that FMOs were established in ﬁsheries where overcapitalization and
resulting low proﬁtability were prominent, perhaps with the aim to reversing that situation.
The diﬀerence in mean-shares between the FMO and non-FMO units was statistically sig-
niﬁcant in 10 out of 11 ﬁshery gear-types. Diving, which mostly targets shellﬁsh and seaweed,
is dominantly operated under the command of FMOs. This is consistent with the notion
that resource co-management suites immobile resources better. The same reasoning might
partially apply for small-scale bottom trawl, since it mainly harvests sedentary or demersal
species that tend to be less mobile (though the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant). Also,
tangible beneﬁts from coordinated ﬁshing eﬀort as part of ﬁshery co-management might be
realized in ﬁsheries prone to congestion and gear-damage as a consequence. This could be
the explanation for the higher share of FMO units in small-scale bottom trawl and gill net
ﬁsheries. On the other hand, the higher share of non-FMO units in aquaculture is intuitive
since the ownership over the resource is best deﬁned.
The basic estimation model is
(1) Ri = Capitaliβ1 + Fisheryiβ2 + δ1FMOi + δ2FMOsizei + ǫi,
where Ri is the average revenue of ﬁshing units in ﬁshing district i, Capitali and Fisheryi
are vectors of capital and ﬁshery gear-types variables explained above, respectively. FMOi is
11a dichotomous dummy variable for whether an observation is of FMO units (=1) or non-FMO
units (=0), and FMOsizei is the average number of units per FMO in a ﬁshing district. Our
interest is the estimated coeﬃcient for δ1. Model (1), however, assumes that the coeﬃcients
β1 and β2 are homogeneous for both FMO and non-FMO units, which might not be true
for some variables. To check for this possibility, average revenue was regressed on covariates
in the Model (1) and all covariates interacted with FMO dummy variable; thus while the
slope of non-FMO units is β that of FMO units is β + δ1. The result showed that for three
covariates – average vessel tonnage, share of other trawl ﬁshery and that of aquaculture –
we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the slopes are homogeneous at the signiﬁcance
level of 10% or higher. This result was incorporated in our subsequent regressions.
The results of heteroskedastic-robust OLS estimation of Model (1) are presented in the
second column of Table 3.11 The estimated coeﬃcient for the FMO dummy variable shows
that on average an FMO unit earns about $13,300 more revenue compared to a comparable
non-FMO unit. This account for about 27% of average revenue for an FMO unit (c.f. Table
4). Most of the capital level-related variables have intuitive results; their signs are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. For gear-type variables, note that one variable, namely the
share of “other ﬁsheries”, was dropped to avoid singularity. The gear-types used in ﬁsheries
included in this category are those require large capital such as high-sea tuna trawl and
oﬀshore bonito hook-and-line, typically operated by corporations and joint-units. But, as
Table 4 shows, about 0.4% and 7% of individual FMO and non-FMO units, respectively, are
engaged in one of the ﬁsheries included in this category. Since these ﬁsheries typically earn
higher revenues (not necessarily the proﬁts), this explains why many estimated coeﬃcients
for gear-type variables are negative.
The third column of Table 3 shows results of an extended version of Model (1), that
includes proceeds sharing rules and marketing enhancement dummy variables (Model (2)).
These two variables are interaction terms with the FMO dummy variable. Results show that
sharing rules had marginal impacts, which contradicts our hypothesis. Several other speci-
11Test for heteroskedasticity rejected the null hypothesis (homoskedasticity) at 1% signiﬁcance level.
12ﬁcations were tried, such as including the average number of years since the establishment
of FMOs in a ﬁshing district. The justiﬁcation for that speciﬁcation was that if there is a
learning process involved in FMO operation and its eﬀectiveness is assumed to improve over
time, then this variable could pick up some of the learning curve heterogeneity in FMOs. An-
other speciﬁcation tried was to interact with the FMO member size variable. None of them,
however, were eﬀective. These results do not disprove the notion that proceeds sharing rules
mitigate rent dissipation incentives but rather suggest for more detailed investigation. For
example, education level of member ﬁshermen and various attributes regarding the leader
of an FMO, all of which were unavailable in the census, might be a much more important
factor in determining the performance of FMOs with proceeds sharing rules.
The results of marketing variables indicate some interesting stories. The introduction
of marketing variable captured the statistical signiﬁcance of the single FMO dummy vari-
able; note that the coeﬃcient estimates and their statistical signiﬁcance of other variables
remained mostly unchanged. This result is suggestive of the notion that the impacts on the
output market conditions, such as price, is a prominent factor in the generation of economic
beneﬁts from local ﬁshery co-management institutions in Japan. Indeed, as Table 3 shows,
FMOs engaged in some kind of marketing practices had signiﬁcant increases in their average
revenues while FMOs without marketing practices did not. Since our dependent variable
is the revenue and not the proﬁt, we cannot conclude anything more about the impact of
marketing relative to that of input cost savings. However, considering the fact that the
eﬀect of cost savings input changes are likely to be gradual whereas increased exvessel price
changes are immediate, it is plausible that marketing eﬀects might be the strongest results
of coastal ﬁshery co-management in Japan.
As aforementioned, there are ﬁve subcategories of marketing as deﬁned in the census.
Given that the marketing as a whole has a prominent impact on the performance of FMOs,
a natural question to ask is: which types of marketing had the most impact? Model (3) in
Table 5 shows the results (Model (2) corresponding to that in Table 3). Interestingly, none
of the marketing subcategories were signiﬁcant individually in statistical sense. In addition,
13FMO dummy variable is signiﬁcant once again, but at lesser degree compared to model
(1). Sub-grouping the marketing practices, such as “onboard” practices ((a) and (b)) and
“onshore” practices ((c), (d) and (e)) as deﬁned in the census, did not alter these outcomes.
One possible explanation for these outcomes is that combinations of marketing practices are
necessary to be eﬀective, and that eﬀective combinations diﬀer by ﬁshing districts.
With an exception of transportation, all have positive signs that are consistent with
our intuition. Among those the quality control (item (b)) has the highest magnitude and
statistical signiﬁcance. This is consistent with the comments expressed by ﬁshermen and
FMO leaders during the author’s ﬁeld trip to Japan, that quality control practices are least
costly and most doable for ﬁshermen. Keeping the catch alive and well while cruising back
to the landing port requires additional costs of capital investment, such as onboard built-in
ﬁsh tanks and water temperature controlling devices. Onshore marketing practices – items
(c) through (e) – are not exactly ﬁshermen’s expertise.12 In contrast, quality control such
as releasing the catch from the net or hooks carefully (minimizing cosmetic damage), apply
proper icing and to avoid catching lesser-value individuals13 are readily doable and something
they could have been doing if they were not under the pressure to “race for ﬁsh”, which is
what FMOs primarily aim to mitigate.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates empirically the eﬀectiveness of ﬁshery co-management, by means
of Japanese FMOs, in enhancing the ﬁshermen’s revenue. We ﬁnd that, at least for the
individual ﬁshing units, those who participate in FMOs have, on average, higher revenues
than their non-participating counterparts after controlling for capital levels and ﬁshery-types.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that much of that economic beneﬁt of FMOs originates
12Recall that FCAs are collective bodies of ﬁshermen, and the chairmen are often senior ﬁshermen. It is
very rare that an FCA hires an outsider as a manager or marketing oﬃcer.
13For example, in the small pink shrimp ﬁshery in Suruga Bay, where the price of shrimp increases with
bigger size, ﬁshermen would ﬁrst haul a basket into the clump they found to check for the size. If the shrimp
is big enough they would haul the trawl net; otherwise they would continue searching for another clump
with bigger shrimp size.
14from various marketing practices, onboard quality control in particular, that enhance the
value of catch in output markets. The impact of marketing practices on revenue found
in this analysis is intuitive, as markets tend to respond quickly to changes in raw product
quality. This implies that, though economic rents could eventually emerge from cost savings,
appropriating the quick gains from output markets could be the key for sustaining the FMO
regime, and ﬁshery co-management in general.
The results found regarding the proceeds sharing rules were somewhat surprising. One
plausible explanation is the notion of “fairness” in the context of sharing rules. One of
the toughest negotiations when implementing the sharing rules is how to redistribute the
pooled proceeds. Uniform distribution might be favored from equity point of view but not
necessarily considered fair, especially if ﬁshermen were heterogeneous in skills and capital
levels. Case studies of Platteau and Seki (2001) and Uchida (2004) were the ones that were
successful in overcoming such obstacles, but perhaps they were among the rare cases. On
the other hand, if an FMO pursuing marketing practices aims for higher exvessel prices and
revenues but without sharing rules then the distribution of bigger “pie” will be in proportion
to ﬁshermen’s individual skills, for example, which is likely to be perceived as fair. Perhaps
this is why we found a strong signiﬁcance for marketing practices but very weak or no
signiﬁcance of sharing rules on the ﬁshermen’s revenue.
The results of this analysis suggest several policy implications for a successful ﬁshery co-
management. Firstly, mere establishment of demarcated areas covered by the ﬁshing rights
and collective body of ﬁshermen, whether it is an FCA or an FMO, are not good enough.
Among the things which an FCA/FMO can do, it is suggested that marketing practices
are high payoﬀ activities for generating returns from ﬁshery co-management. The types of
marketing practices that are most eﬀective depend on the pattern of consumption demand
(such as high raw consumption, as in Japan, or mostly for processed foods), among other
things. Secondly, the fact that marketing had signiﬁcant impact on revenue increase suggests
that beneﬁts arising from the output markets are substantial and important in ﬁshery co-
management. Policies aimed at developing market infrastructure, such as the wholesale ﬁsh
15markets, and means of transporting the ﬁsh (i.e., linking the markets) could beneﬁt the
ﬁshery co-management.
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18Figure 1: Example of ﬁshing rights in Shima, Mie prefecture in western Japan
19Figure 2: This diagram shows typical cases of how ﬁshing districts are deﬁned. Fishing
rights areas are referred as TURFs. For cities A and B, each is deﬁned as separate ﬁshing
district. City C has two ﬁshing districts likely to be deﬁned; one associated with TURF 3
and the other with TURF 4.
20Table 1: Average by unit-category: Full sample (FMO and non-FMO units combined)
Individuals Corporations FCA PCA JO Others
Number of boats (no engine) 0.05 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.14 0.03
Number of powered boats 0.65 0.89 0.91 0.77 0.66 0.30
Number of vessels 0.80 2.77 2.20 3.23 1.49 0.98
Vessel tonnagea 5.8 19.4 7.3 8.4 5.4 230.9
Vessel horsepowera 73.9 75.3 42.6 38.5 54.5 787.5
Fishery revenue ($K) 64.8 2,410 1,560 2,220 335.2 570.5
Number of FMO units 58,195 715 56 40 1,169 4
(% of within total) (96.7%) (1.2%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (1.9%) (0.0%)
Number of non-FMO units 84,999 2,348 233 119 2,591 117
(% of within total) (94.0%) (2.6%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (2.9%) (0.1%)
a Average vessel tonnage and horsepower is calculated as per vessel per unit.
21Table 2: Ideal data versus what the census has and what we did with them. Subscripts i and j denote ﬁshing districts and ﬁshing
units, respectively. Subscript k denotes FMOs in a ﬁshing district.
Variable Ideal Available Data used as...
Dependent variablea Revenue of each unit Average revenue As-is
Rij ¯ Ri = 1
ni
Pni
j=1 Rij ¯ Ri
Capital variablesb Capital levels of each unit Aggregated over units in a district Average values
Cij ˆ Ci =
Pni
j=1 Cij ¯ Ci = 1
ni
ˆ Ci ··· Number of boats/vessels
¯ Ci = 1
nivi
ˆ Ci ··· Tonnage/horsepower
Fishery-gear variablesc Gear-type(s) of each unit Number of units by gear-type Share of each gear-type
Gij,g = (0,1) ˆ Gi,g =
Pni





g ˆ Gi,g ≥ ni
P
g σi,g = 1
Sharing rules variablesd For each FMO, by sharing rules Number of FMOs by sharing rules Share of each sharing rules
Sik,s = (0,1) ˆ Si,s =
PKi
k=1 Sik,s σi,s = 1
Ki
ˆ Si,s P
s ˆ Si,s ≤ Ki
P
s σi,s ≤ 1
Marketing variablese For each FMO, by practices Number of FMOs by practice Share of each practice
Mik,m = (0,1) ˆ Mi,m =
PKi
k=1 Mik,m σi,m = 1
Ki
ˆ Mi,m P
m ˆ Mi,m ≥ Ki
P
m σi,m ≥ 1
a R denotes revenue and ni is the number of ﬁshing units in district i.
b C denotes capital level such as number of vessels owned and tonnage. vi is the total number of vessels in district i.
c Subscript g denotes each gear-type. G is a dichotomous variable; 1 if engaged and 0 otherwise.
d Subscript s denotes each sharing rules. S is a dichotomous variable; 1 if implemented and 0 otherwise. Ki is the number of FMOs in
district i.
e Subscript m denotes each marketing practice. M is a dichotomous variable; 1 if engaged and 0 otherwise.
2
2Table 3: Heteroskedastic-robust OLS estimation
Dependent variable: Average revenuea
Variables Model (1) Model (2)
FMO dummy 13.3 (2.92)∗∗ 8.1 (1.59)
FMO member size 0.05 (1.50) 0.05 (1.41)
Marketings 10.0 (2.60)∗∗
Sharing rules -0.7 (−0.17)
Non-powered boats 17.5 (2.46)∗ 17.8 (2.51)∗
Powered boats 16.8 (5.50)∗∗ 16.7 (5.56)∗∗
Vessels 49.1 (9.01)∗∗ 49.2 (9.05)∗∗
Vessel tonnage 0.04 (0.74) 0.04 (0.80)
Tonnage × FMO dummy 0.3 (2.39)∗ 0.3 (2.55)∗
Vessel engine (hp) 0.0 (0.36) 0.0 (0.11)
Small bottom trawl -18.3 (−0.98) -19.2 (−1.03)
Other bottom trawl 1,740.4 (7.05)∗∗ 1,727.2 (6.99)∗∗
Other bottom trawl × FMO dummy -1,757.0 (−7.45)∗∗ -1,741.3 (−7.39)∗∗
Gill net -42.6 (−2.32)∗ -42.8 (−2.32)∗
Hook and line -34.8 (−1.62) -34.4 (−1.60)
Long line -30.0 (−1.24) -32.6 (−1.31)
Trawl net -20.3 (−0.50) -19.7 (−0.48)
Diving -39.9 (−2.10)∗ -38.8 (−2.04)∗
Set net -21.2 (−0.66) -25.1 (−0.79)
Other capture ﬁsheries -21.5 (−1.14) -21.5 (−1.14)
Aquaculture 31.6 (1.37) 31.6 (1.37)
Aquaculture × FMO dummy 127.6 (1.93) 125.5 (1.91)
Constant 11.3 (0.61) 11.4 (0.61)
Observations 738 738
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.39
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
a Units are in 1,000 U.S. dollars.
23Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables: Averages per ﬁshing district
Variablesa FMO units Non-FMO units
Revenueb 49.7 47.1
Capital Non-powered boats∗∗ 0.03 0.06
Powered boats∗∗ 0.67 0.56
Vessels 0.80 0.83
Vessel tonnage 9.16 8.80
Vessel engine (hp)∗ 150 107
Fishery Small bottom trawl 0.10 0.07
Other bottom trawl∗ 0.007 0.00
Gill net∗∗ 0.25 0.16
Hook and line∗∗ 0.03 0.19
Long line∗∗ 0.02 0.03
Trawl net∗∗ 0.004 0.01
Diving∗∗ 0.38 0.10
Set net∗∗ 0.01 0.03
Other capture ﬁsheries∗∗ 0.17 0.10
Aquaculture∗∗ 0.01 0.23
Other ﬁsheries∗∗ 0.003 0.07




Marketing Total 0.51 –
Freshness 0.19 –
Quality control 0.31 –
Processing 0.07 –
Salea channel 0.22 –
Transportation 0.09 –
Number of observations 534 571c
a Diﬀerence in means: ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
b The unit is ten thousand US dollars ($1=105 yen).
c Number of observations for non-FMO units varied 227–571 depending
on the variables.
24Table 5: Regressions with marketing variables
Variables Model (2) Model (3)
FMO Dummy 8.1 (1.59) 10.6 (2.17)∗
FMO Member size 0.05 (1.41) 0.05 (1.35)
Marketing Total 10.0 (2.60)∗∗
(a) Live catch 4.5 (0.87)
(b) Quality 5.1 (1.13)
(c) Processing 0.03 (0.00)
(d) Sales Channel 4.1 (0.68)
(e) Transportation -6.2 (−0.94)
Observations 738 738
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.39
Note: Capital and ﬁshery variables are suppressed but included in estimation models.
t statistics in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
25